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THE ETHICS OF BLUFFING: THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ON 
PERCEIVED ETHICALITY AND BLUFFING BEHAVIOR 
 
G. Stoney Alder, University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Rebecca M. Guidice, University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Although researchers have debated the ethicality of bluffing in business, little research has examined individuals’ 
attitudes and beliefs towards bluffing and how characteristics of the individual influence such perceptions and subsequent 
behavior. We consider this issue by examining how individuals’ ethical orientation influences their perceptions of the 
ethicality of bluffing select organizational stakeholders, their willingness to bluff, and their actual bluffing behavior. 
Results indicate that ethical orientation exerts direct effects on the perceived ethicality of bluffing and indirect effects on 
individuals’ reported willingness to engage in this misleading form of communication as well as their actual bluffing 
behavior. Implications for research and practice are discussed. 
  
Although bluffing, as a form of misleading 
communication, is a familiar practice to many individuals, 
groups, and organizations, there is little agreement as to its 
ethicality. Indeed, academicians have debated and 
philosophized on the ethicality of bluffing in business for 
decades (e.g., Allhoff, 2003; Carr, 1968; Lewicki and 
Robinson, 1998). Despite these discussions, there is a 
paucity of research that examines individuals’ attitudes and 
beliefs towards bluffing and how characteristics of the 
individual may influence such perceptions. As a result, we 
know little about how individual differences influence 
employees’ perceptions of and willingness to mislead 
others in their communications. This line of research is 
important for at least two reasons. First, from a theory and 
research perspective, a complete understanding of bluffing 
requires full consideration of the variables that may be 
responsible for individuals’ reactions to bluffing as well as 
their willingness to do so themselves. To the extent that 
individual differences affect perceptions of and attitudes 
toward bluffing, any theoretical model that omits individual 
differences is incomplete. Second, this avenue of research 
will similarly contribute to the business ethics literature by 
enhancing our understanding of the effect individual 
difference variables have on individuals’ attitudes, 
intentions, and behaviors in ethical “gray” areas. 
Our paper seeks to shed light on this issue by 
examining how individuals’ ethical orientation (Brady, 
1985, 1990) influences their judgments on the ethicality of 
bluffing various organizational stakeholders, their 
willingness to so, and ultimately, their bluffing behavior in 
a competitive context. Simply put, the research questions 
that we hope to answer are these; does ethical orientation 
help predict different views on the practice of bluffing and 
how do those views influence individuals’ intention to and 
engagement in bluffing? We begin by first examining the 
nature and prevalence of business related bluffing and 
subsequently review existing research on bluffing as related 
to our study.  
 
PART 1: THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
 
Bluffing In and By Organizations 
 
Bluffing is the practice of intentionally communicating 
a misleading signal of intended action with the expectation 
that its recipient(s) interpret and react as if the 
communication were truthful (Guidice et al., 2009). Ample 
evidence exists of instances where parties have used this 
type of communication in an attempt to achieve a superior 
position over competitors or to reach an optimal agreement 
in important negotiations (e.g., Bayus et al., 2001; Heil and 
Langvardt, 1994). For example, Coke and Pepsi developed 
a brief relationship with Holland Sweetener, a foreign 
supplier of artificial sweetener, which they subsequently 
used as a tool in negotiations with their existing supplier, 
Monsanto. Monsonto was led to believe that if they did not 
reduce the price of their sweetener, these two major soda 
manufactures would switch suppliers (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996). Intel publically toyed with the idea of 
relocating its Oregon operations until receiving state tax 
concessions that then allowed the company to better invest 
its resources in the region’s people and property (Sheketoff, 
2005). Kabi and Genentech used decoy patents to mislead 
their rivals into believing research was being conducted on 
multiple processes; the goal of which was to keep rivals 
guessing as to what medical breakthrough the alliance was 
actually pursuing (McKelvey, 1996). North Korea leader, 
Kim Jong II, claimed to have the nuclear weapons needed 
to prevent outside interference in the country’s functioning 
and ideology. Whether government officials were bluffing 
was not entirely known, but given the potential 
consequences if true, the threat gave the regime a temporary 
advantage in negotiations with foreign agencies with which 
they had economic or political ties (Herman, 2005).  
  
Bluffing Research 
 
While signals can be a useful form of communication 
(Milewicz and Herbig, 1997; Porter, 1980), some signals 
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can be disingenuous, containing announcements that the 
sender has no intention of acting upon immediately, if ever. 
Indeed, as suggested in the previous section, bluffing can be 
strategically beneficial (McNeilly, 1996) through its ability 
to convey important information to key stakeholders and/or 
provide the bluffer with valuable knowledge based on 
recipients’ reactions to the announcement. Given its 
widespread use, it is noteworthy that the practice of bluffing 
has, apart from academic discourse in business ethics and 
negotiations, been largely under-investigated. Among a 
variety of issues worthy of continued examination is the 
extent to which individuals consider the practice ethical or 
unethical and what variables help differentiate those views. 
Also missing in the literature is a definitive answer as to 
how those views influence individuals’ intention to and 
subsequent engagement in bluffing.  
Perhaps motivated by the prevalence of bluffing and 
other misleading communication in business, researchers 
and philosophers have long debated its ethicality. On the 
one hand, Eliashberg et al., (1996) argued that it is an 
unacceptable practice and Lewicki and Robinson (1998, 
p.666) considered it to be an objectionable form of lying 
that serves “to misinform the opponent, to eliminate or 
obscure the opponent’s choice alternatives, or to manipulate 
the perceived costs and benefits of particular options that 
the opponent may wish to pursue”. In contrast, advocates of 
bluffing contend that bluffing is acceptable and ethical 
(Allhoff, 2003). Carson (1993) indicates that since there is 
no warrantability for truth with bluffing, the terms lying and 
bluffing cannot be considered synonymous. Carr (1968) 
argued that bluffing may simply be an unspoken rule of the 
game.”  Amidst these two opposing positions is the belief 
that bluffing is an ethically neutral behavior (Anton, 1990). 
Given these varied perspectives, it is clear that the ethicality 
of bluffing is less than straightforward and sits on the 
ethical edge.  
Based on existing ambiguity, there is reason to believe 
that attitudes toward bluffing may not be fixed, but rather 
vary based on a number of variables. One such factor may 
be the severity and legality of the misleading 
communication. Unquestionably, few would argue that the 
accounting manipulations receiving widespread attention in 
today’s press constitute an unethical business practice. Of 
interest in this study, however, is the relatively large gray 
area in which it is less clear where the line between 
ethicality and unethicality may be drawn and where 
additional factors besides severity or legality apply to help 
explain differing judgments of ethicality.  
Another potential determinant of ethical attitudes 
towards different forms of misleading communication 
including bluffs is the target of the act (Ross and Robertson, 
2000). Guidice and colleagues (2009) found that decision 
makers’ views on the ethicality of bluffing differed 
depending on the entity under consideration (e.g. 
individuals were most lenient in their judgments of 
ethicality when the recipient of the bluff is a competitor). 
Allhoff (2003) used a role differentiated perspective to 
make the argument that attitudes on the legitimacy of 
bluffing in business is context specific and thus, is likely to 
be viewed favorably when the parties involved, based on 
their role in business, endorse the practice.   
We add to this growing body of research the 
proposition that individual differences may also help 
predict judgments of the ethicality of bluffing. That is, 
although the content, target, and context of misleading 
communication are clearly important as evidenced by 
existing research, we suggest that they are not the exclusive 
determinants of individuals’ evaluations of bluffing. Some 
individuals may consider a given communication event 
more or less ethical than other individuals consider the 
same communication aimed at the same target, and this 
difference may be best explained by considering 
characteristics of the individual. Indeed, a long line of 
research in organizational behavior indicates that individual 
differences exert important influences on individuals’ 
perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Ethics theory and 
research similarly suggests an important role for a number 
of individual variables, including a person’s stage of moral 
development (Ferrell et al., 1989; Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 
1986; Sparks and Merenski, 2000). Despite this, it is 
noteworthy that research has generally excluded 
consideration of the effect individual differences may have 
on our attitudes and beliefs toward bluffing.    
This paper seeks to address this important gap in the 
literature by examining individual ethical predispositions 
relating to formalist (rules-based) and utilitarian (results-
based) ethical decision making. We propose that different 
ethical orientations will lead to different individual 
assessments of the ethicality of bluffing different entities 
and varied degrees of willingness to use this form of 
misleading communication. Figure 1 depicts the 
relationships that will be examined in the current study. 
 
Ethical Orientation 
 
Classifying how individuals interpret ethical situations 
by identifying their ethical orientation has occupied ethical 
scholars for some time. Ethical orientation is an 
individual’s predisposition to rely on a certain pattern of 
reasoning when evaluating ethical issues. One well-known 
distinction differentiates between formalist and utilitarian 
reasoning (Brady, 1985, 1990). Formalism (often associated 
with Kantian ethics) and utilitarianism (often associated 
with Bentham and Mills) parallel deontology and teleology 
respectively (Brady, 1990), which Kohlberg (1984, p. 579) 
suggested are "the two major ethical principles." Nozick 
(1981, p. 494) argued that all of substantive ethics has been 
fitted or poured into these two powerful and appealing 
molds. Brady and Wheeler (1996) similarly concluded that 
the distinction between formalism and utilitarianism may be 
the most important distinction in ethical theory. 
2
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FIGURE 1 
 
Theoretical Relationship Between Ethical Predisposition, Perceived Instrumentality, Perceived Ethicality, Pressure, 
and Bluffing Behavior 
 
 
 
As a personal predisposition, formalists are considered 
past oriented; relying on a set of rules, principles, or 
standards for guiding behavior (Brady, 1985; Reynolds, 
2006). According to formalists, actions are ethical or not to 
the extent that they adhere to these rules, principles, or 
standards irrespective of their outcome. In contrast, 
utilitarians are future oriented; evaluating the ethicality of 
actions in terms of their expected consequences or results 
(Brady, 1985; Reynolds, 2006). Rather than look for some 
inherent morality to determine if a given action is ethical or 
not, utilitarians consider actions to be ethical if they 
produce the greatest possible outcome.  
Traditionally, formalism and utilitarianism were 
viewed as opposite ends of a single ethical continuum such 
that stronger tendencies toward one implied weaker 
tendencies toward the other. More recently, research 
indicates that instead, they represent two independent 
dimensions of an individual's ethical predisposition. That is, 
individuals may prefer one or both - and each to a greater or 
lesser degree - when reasoning through ethical situations 
(Brady, 1990; Brady and Wheeler, 1996; Schminke and 
Wells, 1999).  
Research indicates employees’ ethical orientations may 
influence their interpretations of and attitudes towards 
organization-based procedures and practices. For example, 
Reynolds (2006) found evidence suggesting that formalism 
and utilitarianism provide patterns by which organizational 
information is processed and thereby serve as guides for 
individuals’ attention. Consistent with this logic, Alder and 
colleagues (Alder et al., 2007; Alder et al., 2008) found that 
ethical orientation affects employees’ judgments of the 
appropriateness and usefulness of potentially invasive 
human resource programs (i.e., internet monitoring, drug 
testing, and background checks). Our study extends this 
research by examining the effect ethical orientation has on 
individuals’ assessments of the ethicality of bluffing and on 
their willingness do so.  
 
Ethical Orientation and Bluffing 
 
Formalists focus on principles when deciding what is 
morally right and are less concerned with the outcome of an 
act in making ethical determinations. For formalists, acts 
are right in and of themselves regardless of the outcomes 
they lead to. When assessing various employee behaviors, 
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including business related bluffing, formalists should 
therefore consider the extent to which doing so violates or 
adheres to their ethical principles. A number of 
philosophers and ethical theorists have concluded that the 
central issue in ethics involves rights and duties (Sumner, 
2000). This approach maintains that the ethical act or 
decision is the one that recognizes and respects the rights of 
others and the duties that those rights impose on the actor. 
Among the most often cited rights is the right to be told the 
truth.  
If individuals have the right to be told the truth, then 
individuals sending signals or other forms of 
communication have a concomitant duty to not tell a lie. 
Lewicki (1983) defined lying as “any intentionally 
deceptive message which is stated”. Lewicki and Robinson 
(1998) propose that dishonesty in negotiation is primarily 
concerned with problems of lying and truth telling. To the 
extent that bluffing is synonymous with lying, it violates 
actors’ duty to avoid lying. However, as described above, 
there is considerable debate in the literature as to whether or 
not bluffing is synonymous with lying (see Carson, 1993; 
Lewicki and Robinson, 1998). As such, it appears bluffing 
may lie in a gray zone on the continuum from truth telling 
to lying. We would expect that high formalists, with their 
focus on moral rules, would be more sensitive to this gray 
zone than low formalists. As a result, high formalists will 
likely consider bluffing counter to their ethical guidelines 
and therefore unethical regardless of the non-moral 
outcomes it generates.    
 
Hypothesis 1: Ethical formalism will be negatively 
related to individuals’ perceptions of the ethicality 
of bluffing business stakeholders. 
 
In contrast, utilitarians focus on outcomes rather 
principles when assessing the ethicality of actions and 
decisions. For these individuals, the focus is on whether or 
not the action or decision will be effective at accomplishing 
the goal they were designed to pursue. Thus, the issue of 
effectiveness should be highly salient for utilitarians when 
assessing the ethicality of bluffing. In this context, ethical 
judgments may boil down to weighing the non-moral gains 
and losses that will accrue to the various stakeholders as a 
result of the bluff. Consequently, for utilitarians, providing 
seemingly innocuous misleading information to a 
competitor or other organizational stakeholder may be 
deemed appropriate if it leads to valuable outcomes such as 
a vital sale.  
A number of researchers indicate that bluffing is an 
important ingredient for organizational effectiveness. Zahra 
(1994) found that executives often justify their competitive 
practices on the grounds that competition is similar to war, 
which subsequently makes acts that maintain or improve 
one’s position in the marketplace permissible. D’Aveni 
(1994; 1995) argued that signaling was an essential tool for 
fending off rivals in intensely competitive markets. In 
particular, he suggested that signals, such as 
preannouncements, be used to create uncertainty or 
otherwise manipulate competitors’ anticipated moves. 
Given utilitarians’ focus on effectiveness we would expect 
high utilitarians to view bluffing more favorably than low 
utilitarians.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Ethical utilitarianism will be 
positively related to individuals’ perceptions of the 
ethicality of bluffing competitors and other 
organizational stakeholders. 
 
Ethics is an important concern for society, businesses, 
and most individuals. Indeed, nine out of ten large 
corporations have a code of ethics in place (Murphy, 1995). 
The primary objectives of most corporate ethics training 
programs is developing in employees an awareness of what 
constitutes ethical issues and providing employees with 
practical decision making models (Harrington, 1991). These 
foci indicate there is an implicit assumption that employees 
already care about ethics and they simply need help in 
making better ethical judgments. All else being equal, we 
therefore expect individuals’ perception of the ethicality of 
bluffing to be an important determinant of their willingness 
to engage in such behavior. This belief is also supported by 
the theory of planned behavior wherein it is suggested that 
attitudes influence behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Consistent with this logic, 
Guidice et al. (2009) found that decision makers that view 
competitor bluffing as more ethical (less unethical) were 
more willing to engage in bluffing. We expect the same 
relationship to hold for not only competitors, but also other 
targets of misleading communication and therefore predict: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived ethicality will mediate the 
relationship between individuals’ ethical 
orientation and their willingness to bluff 
competitors and other organizational stakeholders.  
 
METHOD 
 
We tested our hypotheses with a study that we detail in 
two parts. In part one, forty first-year MBA students and 
sixty-seven senior undergraduate business students enrolled 
in a major Southwestern university completed a survey that 
collected demographic information, formalist and utilitarian 
ethical orientations, and attitudes and beliefs toward 
bluffing. Participants received extra course credit for their 
participation. Analysis revealed no significant differences 
in demographics or bluffing behavior (explained in part two 
of the study) between MBA and undergraduates; therefore 
their data was combined in our analyses. Fifty-five percent 
of the participants were female. The average age of 
respondents was 26.5 years. Ninety-seven percent reported 
having work experience, with an average of eight years. 
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Fifty-four percent had managerial experience, with an 
average of two years.  
 
Measures 
 
Ethical Orientation 
The character traits version of the Measure of Ethical 
Viewpoints is an alternative measure of the relative strength 
of participants’ utilitarian and formalist ethical orientations 
(Brady and Wheeler, 1996). Developed as a pencil-and-
paper test for ethical predisposition, this instrument lists 
twenty character traits (e.g., effective, honest, results 
oriented, law-abiding) that subjects rate on a seven-point 
scale (1 = not important to me, 7 = very important to me) 
according to their personal judgment of the trait’s 
importance. For consistency with the rest of the survey, we 
utilized a five point scale rather than Brady and Wheeler’s 
(1996) seven point scale. 
Brady and Wheeler (1996) report factor analytic results 
revealing two major factors in this instrument. Factor 1, 
utilitarianism, included the traits of innovative, resourceful, 
effective, influential, results-oriented, productive, and a 
winner. Factor 2, formalism, included the traits of 
principled, dependable, trustworthy, honest, noted for 
integrity, and law-abiding. Reliabilities for the two scales in 
their sample were 0.75 and 0.86, respectively. Consistent 
with prior studies, we calculated a utilitarian score and a 
formalist score for each participant by averaging the 
responses to the items belonging to each scale. 
Utilitarianism scores ranged from 2.3 to 5.0 with a mean of 
4.0 (alpha = .81) and formalism scores ranged from 2.8 to 
5.0 with a mean of 4.5 (alpha = .75).  
 
Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing 
Adapted from Ross and Robertson (2000), participants 
were presented with a short scenario that described the 
opportunity to make a large, valuable sale. However, in 
order to complete the sale, one entity (competitor, 
customer, distributor, or company/employer) would need to 
be provided with misleading information. On a 5-point 
scale (1 = definitely unethical to 5 = definitely ethical) 
participants were asked to indicate how appropriate it 
would be to mislead each of the aforementioned targets.  
 
Willingness to Bluff  
Using the same scenario reported above, participants 
were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale (1 = absolutely no 
chance to 5 = definitely willing) whether they would be 
willing to mislead the competitor, customer, distributor, or 
their company, in order to make the sale.  
 
Controls 
 
Prior research indicates that individuals’ interpretations 
of and reactions to ethical dilemmas is influenced by a 
variety of demographic variables including age, gender, and 
culture. For instance, it has been suggested that older 
individuals and women may have higher ethical standards 
than younger individuals and men (e.g., Dawson, 1997; 
Peterson, Rhoads, and Vaught, 2001). Thus, we controlled 
for participants’ age, gender, and citizenship in all analyses 
prior to adding other variables in our regression models. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and 
intercorrelations for the variables described above.  
There has been discussion in the literature about the 
appropriate method for testing mediation. MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) conducted a 
Monte Carlo simulation to compare 14 methods to test 
mediation. Results indicate that the widely used method 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) has Type I error rates 
that are too small in all conditions and have very lower 
power, unless the effect or sample size is large. The authors 
suggested that an indirect effects approach better evaluates 
the mediation relationship (see also Collins et al., 1998). 
Specifically, they argued that in contrast to the Baron and 
Kenny approach, the test of joint significance provides the 
best balance of Type I error and statistical power and 
therefore they “strongly recommend this test for 
experimental investigations involving simple intervening 
variable models” (MacKinnon et al., 2002, p. 99).  
The joint significance test approach suggests that one 
can conclude mediation when two conditions are met: 1) 
the independent variable predicts the mediator, and 2) the 
mediator predicts the dependent variable, controlling for the 
independent variables (MacKinnon et al., 2002). We follow 
this approach here by conducting several regression 
analyses. The first set of regression analyses assesses the 
relationship between ethical orientation and the perceived 
ethicality of misleading various stakeholders, which 
addresses the first condition for mediation and Hypotheses 
1 and 2. The subsequent set of regressions assesses the 
relationship between perceived ethicality and individuals’ 
willingness to mislead the stakeholders, which addresses 
the second condition for mediation and indicates whether 
mediation is supported. 
Results for the first step in the mediation test are shown 
in Table 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that ethical formalism 
would be negatively related to individuals’ perceptions of 
the ethicality of bluffing. As shown in Table 2, this 
hypothesis was largely supported. After controlling for age, 
gender, and citizenship, there was a significant negative 
main effect for formalism on the perceived ethicality of 
misleading distributors (β = -.30, p < .01), one’s company 
(β = -.22, p < .05), and competitors (β = -.29, p < .01). 
While in the expected direction, the relationship between 
formalism and perceived ethicality of misleading customers 
did not reach statistical significance (β = -.16, p = ns).
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TABLE 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
 
Variable Mean  s.d.    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10   11    12 
1. Age 26.54 6.10             
2. Gender 0.55 0.50  .14            
3. Citizenship 0.11 0.31  .07 -.03           
4. Ethicality 
Company 
 
1.43 
 
0.92 
 
-.06 
 
-.20* 
 
 .11 
         
5. Ethicality 
Distributor 
 
1.72 
 
0.98 
 
-.09 
 
-.16 
 
 .11 
 
.69** 
        
6. Ethicality 
Customer 
 
1.46 
 
0.92 
 
-.14 
 
-.14 
 
 .02 
 
.27** 
 
.49** 
       
7. Ethicality 
Competitor 
 
2.65 
 
1.35 
 
-.08 
 
-.18 
 
 .09 
 
.24** 
 
.56** 
 
.47** 
      
8. Willingness  
Distributor 
 
2.01 
 
1.03 
 
-.07 
 
-.19* 
 
 .02 
 
.36** 
 
.65** 
 
.31** 
 
.49** 
     
9. Willingness 
Competitor 
 
3.15 
 
1.46 
 
-.13 
 
-.23* 
  
 .07 
 
.39** 
 
.56** 
 
.44** 
 
.67** 
 
.65** 
    
10. Willingness 
Company 
 
1.51 
 
0.84 
 
-.03 
 
-.24* 
 
 .03 
 
.64** 
 
.51** 
 
.28** 
 
.26** 
 
 46** 
 
.32** 
   
11. Willingness 
Customer 
 
1.74 
 
0.98 
 
-.15 
 
-.15 
 
 .12 
 
.34** 
 
.52** 
 
.69** 
 
.49** 
 
 46** 
 
.49** 
 
.51** 
  
12. Formalism 4.47 0.45  .09  27** .05 -.19* -.24* -.18 -.18 -34** -.15 -25** -.12  
13. Utilitarianism 4.00 0.59  .00  .04 -.10  .01  .01 -.06  .12  .05  .10  .04  .07 .47** 
n = 107 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a positive relationship between 
utilitarianism and individuals’ perceptions of the ethicality 
of bluffing. The results depicted in Table 2 supported this 
hypothesis for two of the four targets as reflected by the 
significant relationship between utilitarianism and the 
perceived ethicality of misleading distributors (β = .14, p < 
.10) and competitors (β = .24, p < .05). As with formalism, 
results were in the expected direction; however, the 
relationship between utilitarianism and perceived ethicality 
of misleading one’s company (β = .10, p = ns) and 
customers (β = .00, p = ns) did not reach a meaningful level 
of significance. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Regression Analysis: Ethical Orientation on Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing Stakeholders 
Dependent Variable: Ethicality of Bluffing 
Distributors 
Ethicality of Bluffing 
Company 
Ethicality of Bluffing 
Competitors 
Ethicality of Bluffing 
Customers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
Age 
Gender 
Citizenship 
Formalism 
Utilitarianism 
 
Adjusted R2 
Model F 
 
     -.08 
     -.15 
      .11 
 
 
 
      .01 
    1.44 
 
     -.06 
     -.07 
      .14 
     -.30** 
      .14† 
 
      .06 
    2.39* 
 
    -.04 
    -.19* 
     .10 
 
 
 
       .02 
    1.82 
 
    -.03 
    -.14 
     .13 
    -.22* 
     .10 
 
     .04 
   1.88† 
 
     -.06 
     -.18 
      .09 
 
 
 
       .02 
     1.64 
 
     -.05 
     -.10 
      .13 
     -.29** 
      .24* 
 
      .08 
    2.75* 
 
    -.12 
    -.13 
     .02 
 
 
 
     .01 
   1.20 
 
    -.11 
    -.09 
     .03 
    -.16 
     .00 
 
     .01 
   1.21 
n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown 
†   p < .10 
*   p < .05 
** p < .01  
 
The next set of analyses tests the second step for 
mediation and examines Hypothesis 3, which predicted that 
perceived ethicality would mediate the relationship between 
participants’ ethical orientation and their willingness to 
bluff. Table 3 displays the results of this analysis. These 
results largely support our third hypothesis. As expected, 
the perceived ethicality of misleading stakeholders 
significantly predicts individuals’ willingness to mislead 
distributors (β = .55, p < .001) and competitors (β = .68, p < 
.001). Also as expected, there is a significantly positive 
6
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relationship between the extent to which participants’ 
believe misleading their company or customers is ethical 
and their reported willingness to mislead their company (β 
= .59, p < .001) or customers (β = .67, p < .001) 
respectively. However, inasmuch as formalism was not 
significantly related to the ethicality of misleading 
customers and utilitarianism did not significantly influence 
the perceived ethicality of misleading customers or one’s 
company we can not conclude that perceived ethicality 
mediates these two stakeholder relationships. In sum, the 
results support Hypothesis 3 for two of our targets. The 
perceived ethicality of bluffing distributors and customers 
mediates the relationship between ethical orientation and 
individuals’ willingness to bluff those targets. In contrast, 
the results partially support Hypothesis 3 as it relates to 
customers and one’s company. The perceived ethicality of 
bluffing customers and one’s company affects individuals’ 
willingness to bluff these targets but does not mediate 
between ethical orientation and bluffing behavior.    
 
TABLE 3 
 
Regression Analysis: Perceived Ethicality on Willingness to Bluff Stakeholders 
 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Bluff 
Distributors 
Willingness to Bluff 
Company 
Willingness to Bluff 
Competitors 
Willingness to Bluff 
Customers 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 
Age 
Gender 
Citizenship 
Formalism 
Utilitarianism 
Distributor Ethicality 
Company Ethicality 
Competitor Ethicality    
Customer Ethicality  
Adjusted R2 
Model F 
 
     -.03 
     -.04 
      .09 
     -.39** 
      .26* 
 
      
 
      
      .11 
    3.57** 
 
      .01 
      .01 
    -.01 
    -.20* 
     .17* 
     .55** 
       
 
    
      .50 
  18.20** 
 
     .02 
    -.17† 
     .05 
    -.29** 
     .15 
 
   
 
  
      .08 
    2.88* 
 
     .04 
    -.09 
    -.02 
    -.17† 
     .09 
 
    .59** 
      
 
     .42 
 13.23** 
 
     -.11 
     -.14 
      .10 
    -.16 
      .20† 
 
 
     
 
       .05 
     2.09† 
 
     -.07 
     -.07 
      .02 
      .04 
      .04 
      
 
      .68** 
 
       .47 
   16.09** 
 
    -.13 
    -.07 
     .15 
    -.18 
     .15 
 
  
 
  
      .08 
    1.80 
 
    -.06 
    -.01 
     .13† 
    -.07   
     .15† 
 
      
 
    .67** 
     .51       
 16.83** 
n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown 
†   p < .10 
*   p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
DISCUSSION 
  
Consistent with our hypotheses, the first part of our 
study revealed a significant relationship between 
participants’ ethical orientations and their assessments of 
the ethicality of bluffing a competitor, company, and 
distributor. Also as expected, results indicate a significant 
relationship between participants’ perception of the degree 
to which engaging in a questionable practice such as 
bluffing is ethical and their reported willingness to engage 
in the practice. The second part of our study extends these 
findings by exploring attitudes and behaviors in a 
laboratory experiment. 
 
PART 2: THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
 
Although the results of our survey generally supported 
our hypothesized relationships, there may be a difference 
between individuals’ reported willingness to breach ethical 
principles in a fictitious scenario and their willingness to do 
so in an actual situation where real outcomes are tied to 
their behavior. Although a growing stream of research 
examines the effect of ethical orientation on individuals’ 
assessments of ethicality (Alder et al. 2007; Alder et al., 
2008), less research considers the effect of ethical 
orientation on individuals’ ethical behavior.  
Extensive research on the person-situation debate in 
organizational behavior provides strong evidence to suggest 
that neither individual nor situational variables alone 
completely account for individual behavior (Kenrick and 
Funder, 1988). Rather, characteristics of the individual 
interact with characteristics of the environment to 
determine attitudes and behaviors. Part two of our study 
therefore examines the effects of perceived ethicality as 
well as the interactive effect of ethical orientation with 
facets of the broader context on the degree to which 
individuals’ try to bluff rivals in a competitive situation. 
Figure 1 also illustrates these proposed relationships. 
 
Perceived Ethicality 
 
As described above, ethical judgments can influence 
individuals’ behaviors such that the more ethical (less 
unethical) they view bluffing, the more they are willing to 
engage in the behavior (Guidice et al., 2009). The theory of 
reasoned action likewise indicates that attitudes impact 
intentions (e.g., Ajzen and Madden, 1986; Albarracin et al., 
2001; Flannery and May, 2000; Beck and Azjen, 1991) and 
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that these attitudes and intentions precede behavior 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Studies in the negotiations 
literature have similarly argued that the more individuals 
regard deception as appropriate, the greater their intention 
to use the tactic in negotiations (Anton, 1990; Lewicki and 
Stark, 1996). Individuals’ assessments of the ethicality of 
bluffing rivals in a competitive arena should therefore be 
positively related to the occurrence of the behavior itself 
(i.e., the extent to which they decide to actually engage in 
bluffing behavior). We therefore predict the following:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Participants’ perceptions of the 
ethicality of bluffing competitors will be positively 
related to the extent to which they attempt to do so. 
 
Other factors may influence decisions to engage in 
questionable business practices. Indeed, some of the ethical 
violations that have been documented in the press are of 
such a nature that one can hardly doubt the individuals 
involved knew, at least at some level, that their actions were 
morally questionable. Although a myriad of factors may 
explain help such behavior, we examine two here - pressure 
to perform the behavior and instrumentality of the behavior. 
  
Pressure  
Researchers agree that individuals may engage in 
questionable conduct in response to situational pressures 
and stressful working conditions (Rest, 1984; Trevino, 
1987). For example, research indicates that unethical 
behavior may be associated with stressful social issues in 
the workplace (Van Zyle and Lazenby, 2002), a 
combination of unrealistic goals and a lack of support from 
supervisors (Simms, 1992), and strict rules and regulations 
(Erman, 1994). Ample anecdotal and survey evidence 
similarly support this conclusion. When managers from 
profile ethical scandals were asked why they implemented 
decisions that were unethical, a common response was the 
Nuremberg defense: “I thought this may have been wrong, 
but my boss told me to do it. I was just following orders” 
(Goldsmith, 2004). In the 1990s, ethical violations at 
Prudential Insurance became so pervasive that the 
company's management eventually estimated its liability 
from the pending class-action lawsuit at $2 billion. Among 
the testimony from the case was the explanation that, “Your 
judgment gets clouded out in the field when you are 
pressured to sell, sell, sell” (Rudin, 2007). A survey of 
1,300 workers by the American Society of Chartered Life 
Underwriters and Chartered Financial Consultants revealed 
that nearly half of the respondents took part in unethical or 
illegal activity, such as deceiving customers, as a result of 
pressure (Marchetti, 1997).   
In sum, pressure or the need to succeed in a 
competitive environment can “force” individuals to commit 
ethically questionable acts they would not have otherwise 
committed. As indicated earlier, strategic scholars have 
argued that bluffing is essential to success in competitive 
environments (D’Aveni, 1994; 1995; Zahra, 1994). These 
arguments suggest that the greater the pressure or need to 
perform individuals feel, the more likely they will be to 
perform a potentially questionable act such as providing 
competitors with misleading signals of intent.  
 
Hypothesis 5a: Individuals’ felt pressure to perform 
will be positively related to their efforts to bluff 
competitors.  
 
Building on the previous hypothesis, we expect ethical 
formalism to moderate the pressure-bluffing behavior 
relationship. For formalists, moral imperatives are without 
exception. Hence, the moral imperative, “never tell a lie”. 
In view of this rigidity, we would expect that the extent to 
which high formalists attempt to mislead their rivals in a 
competitive situation will be driven by their ethical 
orientation rather than by their pressure to perform. In 
contrast, we expect low formalists to be less stringent and 
more flexible in their response to ethically gray areas, 
including bluffing. Given such latitude in response, 
considerations beyond perceived ethicality, including the 
pressure to perform, may influence the behavior of low 
formalists. In short, the relationship between pressure to 
perform and misleading behavior will be weaker for high 
formalists than for low formalists.  
 
Hypothesis 5b: Ethical formalism will moderate 
the relationship between individuals’ felt pressure 
to perform and their efforts to bluff competitors. 
  
Instrumentality 
 
A number of well established theories of motivation 
suggest that individuals are motivated to do those things 
that have high instrumentality (i.e., perform behaviors 
which lead to desirable outcomes). For example, the basic 
tenet of expectancy theory is that individuals are motivated 
to do that which is they believe is possible and valuable 
(Vroom, 1964). Similarly, a classic justification for 
behavior is that the ends justify the means. This rationale 
suggests that individuals will be more inclined to commit a 
questionable act if it is instrumental in producing a 
desirable outcome than if the act is not instrumental in 
producing such an outcome.  
Anecdotally, stories abound of managers and 
employees who perform ethically questionable behaviors 
with the hopes of accomplishing desirable outcomes either 
for them or for the organization. The role of instrumentality 
is clearly manifested in the scandal involving impeached 
Illinois governor, Rod Blagojevich, and his 
communications as he sought to fill the senate seat vacated 
by Barack Obama. Reportedly, the governor sought 
substantial monetary benefits for himself and his wife as 
well as a cabinet post or ambassadorship in exchange for 
his improper use of his political power. Other instances 
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detail less blatantly fraudulent, yet questionable, behavior 
done with the belief that it would prove instrumental for 
other stakeholders including one’s company. In the context 
of our study, this logic and case evidence suggests that 
individuals, groups, and organizations will be more likely to 
attempt to bluff rivals if they believe it will prove useful 
and enhance their chances of “winning” the competition.  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Participants’ beliefs in the 
instrumentality of bluffing competitors will be 
positively related to their efforts to do so.  
 
Building on the previous hypothesis, we expect ethical 
utilitarianism to moderate the instrumentality-bluffing 
behavior relationship. Utilitarians may well recognize that a 
practice has questionable moral overtones, yet their 
behavioral responses may be overridden by a focus on 
instrumentality. Because ethical utilitarians are concerned 
primarily with results, rather than rules or processes (Brady, 
1990), we expect that a strong utilitarian orientation will 
further enhance the relationship between a belief in bluffing 
competitors as a beneficial tactic and their inclinations to 
utilize the tactic. Numerous case examples exist of decision 
makers who explicitly calculated non-moral outcomes to 
justify actions that were questionable from a purely moral 
perspective. A classic example is the case of Ford when 
producing the Pinto. In this scenario, executives quantified 
the monetary gains of placing the fuel tank in a location on 
the vehicle they knew would lead to accidents and deaths. 
These gains were juxtaposed with assessments of the value 
of life, which led to the decision to keep the fuel tank in that 
questionable location. 
Thus, to the extent that misleading others proves 
advantageous, other considerations will exert less influence 
over the behavior of high utilitarians. By contrast, low 
utilitarians are less concerned with the importance of 
outcomes and thus, the relationship between belief in the 
instrumentality of bluffing and their actual bluffing 
behavior should be less pronounced. Stated differently, the 
relationship between perceived instrumentality and 
misleading behavior will be stronger for high utilitarians 
than for low utilitarians.  
 
Hypothesis 6b: Ethical utilitarianism will 
moderate the relationship between perceived 
instrumentality and individuals’ efforts to bluff 
competitors.  
 
METHOD 
 
This part of the investigation relied on the same 
students who completed the survey used in part one of our 
study. This part of the study began with a laboratory 
experiment in which students competed in a simulated 
market-entry game. Upon completion of the simulation, 
participants were asked a series of questions about their 
thoughts and experiences in the game.  
 
Simulation 
 
Upon arrival to the study, participants were informed 
that the purpose of the study was to better understand 
decisions and behaviors in a strategic context and were 
given instructions for playing a thirty-round simulated 
market entry game. Specifically, at the start of each round, 
the game administrator announced the carrying capacity (c) 
for a newly created market, the value of which varied 
randomly from round to round. Using tokens to signal their 
intention to competitors, participants were asked 
(simultaneously) to indicate whether or not they intended to 
enter the market. After their nonverbal signals were 
recorded by a second game administer, the first game 
instructor then asked everyone to simultaneously reveal 
their answers to a second question – whether or not they 
actually entered the market.  
Each participant began the game with four points extra 
credit and were told that the amount of extra credit that they 
would receive depended on their performance . 
Performance in the game was a function of the number of 
players that entered the market each round relative to the 
market’s carrying capacity. Players that chose not to enter 
received zero points. Those that entered a market earned 
points if the number of entrants was equal to or less than the 
announced carrying capacity (i.e., balanced or under 
capacity). Entering participants lost points when excess 
competitors entered the market relative to the market’s 
carrying capacity (i.e., over capacity). The nature of 
this game allowed us to explore two key elements that were 
not present in the pre-game survey. First, rather than 
examine ethical perceptions and related behavioral 
predispositions associated with a hypothetical situation, this 
portion of our study focused on ethical judgments and 
actual behavior in a real situation with tangible outcomes 
linked to performance. Second, whereas in the survey the 
utility of misleading stakeholders was given (the sale would 
be made), the utility of bluffing in the competitive game 
was open to the judgment of the participant. This 
manipulation enabled us to explore the effect of perceived 
usefulness of bluffing—a concept we hypothesized as a 
critical determinant of the effect of utilitarianism. 
Following the game, participants completed a second 
survey that tapped their reactions to the game. They were 
then debriefed on the purpose of the study and thanked for 
their participation.  
 
Measures 
 
Ethical Orientation 
The relative strength of participants’ utilitarian or 
formalist ethical orientations was measured on the survey 
administered in part one of the study using the character 
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traits version of the Measure of Ethical Viewpoints (Brady 
and Wheeler, 1996). 
 
Pressure to Perform  
Participants’ felt need to do well in the game was 
measured with three items developed for this study. A 
sample item included, “I wanted to do well in this game 
because the extra credit was important to me.”  Principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation was conducted 
to determine the factor structure. As expected, items loaded 
on one factor to explain 59.6% of the variance. Cronbach’s 
alpha for this newly created measure was .66.  
 
Instrumentality  
We developed a three item measure to assess each 
participant’s belief that bluffing competitors was a useful 
tactic in the game. As expected, items loaded on one factor; 
however, the inter-item correlation of one item was below 
the minimum benchmark .40 (Nunnally, 1978) and 
therefore, was removed. The remaining factor structure 
explained 77.6% of the variance and had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .71. Using a 5 point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 
5 = strongly agree), the two items used in the analyses were 
“Deception can help players succeed in this game” and 
“Players who hide their true intentions probably have a 
better chance of winning than those who do not hide their 
intentions”. 
 
Perceived Ethicality of Bluffing Competitors 
Three items measured the extent to which participants 
believed it was ethical to bluff in this competitive situation. 
A sample item included, “If a player wants to be completely 
ethical in this game, they should not attempt to influence 
other players by giving misleading information.” Principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation supported a 
single dimension, with one factor explaining 57.7% of the 
variance. Cronbach’s alpha for this newly created measure 
was .63.  
  
Bluffing Behavior 
The extent to which participants’ attempted to mislead 
their competitors was assessed with three items. Principal 
components analysis with varimax rotation supported a 
single dimension, with the one factor explaining 72.9% of 
the variance. Cronbach’s alpha for this newly created 
measure was .81. A sample item included, “In general, I 
only signaled that I intended to enter a market if I really 
intended to do so.” 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4 presents means, standard deviations, and 
intercorrelations for all variables in the second part of the 
study. As before, we controlled for age, gender, and 
citizenship in all analyses.  
 
TABLE 4 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations 
 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.   Age 26.54 6.10         
2.  Gender 0.55 0.50 .14        
3.  Citizenship 0.11 0.31 .09 -.07       
4. Bluffing Behavior 2.92 1.02 .17 .01 -.04      
5. Perceived 
Ethicality 
3.20 0.89 .07 -.07 -.10 -
.30** 
    
6. Pressure to 
Perform 
3.92 0.77 -.16 .06 .01 .04 -.23*    
7. Instrumentality 3.12 0.92 -.05 -.03 .12 .33** -.15 .40**   
8. Formalism 4.47 0.45 .09 .27** .05 .05 -.11 .36** .00  
9. Utilitarianism 4.00 0.59 .00 .04 -.10 .02 -.11 .44** .08 .47** 
n = 107 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
We tested our hypotheses with a series of regression 
analyses. To mitigate multicollinearity concerns, we mean 
centered the independent variables prior to creating 
interaction terms and running the regression analyses 
(Aiken and West, 1991).   
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between 
participants’ perceptions of the ethicality of misleading 
competitors and their bluffing behavior. As shown in Table 
5, this hypothesis was supported, reflected by the 
significant relationship between perceived ethicality and 
bluffing behavior (β = .29, p <.01).   
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TABLE 5 
 
Regression Analysis: Perceived Ethicality on Bluffing Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Bluffing Behavior  
Model 1: 
Controls 
Model 2: 
Direct Effects 
Constant 
Age 
Gender 
Citizenship 
Ethicality 
 
Adjusted R2 
Model F 
 
.17† 
-.01 
-.05 
 
 
.00 
1.09 
 
.15 
.01 
-.02 
.29** 
 
.08 
3.20* 
 
 n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown 
†   p < .10 
*   p < .05 
** p < .01  
 
As shown in Table 6, results failed to support 
Hypothesis 5a as the relationship between pressure to 
perform and bluffing behavior was not significant (β = -.08, 
p = ns). However, as predicted by hypothesis 5b, there was 
a significant interaction between formalism and pressure (β 
= .17, p<.05). Thus, it appears that pressure does influence 
bluffing behavior; however, its effect is completely 
moderated by formalist orientation. 
 
TABLE 6 
 
Indirect Effects of Ethical Orientation on Bluffing Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Performance (Points in a Round) 
Model 1: 
Controls 
Model 2: 
Direct Effects 
Model 3: 
Interaction 
Constant 
Age 
Gender 
Citizenship 
Pressure to Perform 
Instrumentality 
Formalism 
Utilitarianism 
Pressure x Formalism 
Instrumentality x Utilitarianism 
 
Adjusted R2 
Model F 
 
.17† 
-.01 
-.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
1.09 
 
.18† 
-.00 
-.10 
-.08 
.38** 
 
 
 
 
 
.11 
3.76** 
 
.15 
-.02 
-.12 
-.14 
.42** 
.15 
-.00 
.17* 
.16† 
 
.13 
2.71** 
n = 107. Standardized regression coefficients are shown 
†   p < .10 
*   p < .05 
**  p < .01  
 
Hypothesis 6a predicted that participants’ beliefs in the 
instrumentality of misleading competitors would be 
positively related to their bluffing behavior. As seen in 
Table 6, a significant relationship between perceptions of 
instrumentality and bluffing behavior emerged providing 
support for this hypothesis (β = .38, p<.01). The results also 
provide support for Hypothesis 6b as utilitarianism 
interacted with perceived instrumentality to affect bluffing 
behavior (β = .16, p<.10). That is, the relationship between 
instrumentality and bluffing is stronger for high utilitarians 
and weaker for low utilitarians. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this part of our study indicate that 
perceived ethicality significantly affects individuals’ 
bluffing behavior in an actual competitive environment 
with tangible outcomes associated with performance. 
Findings also show that ethical orientation indirectly 
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influences individuals’ bluffing behavior toward 
competitors, with formalism moderating the relationship 
between instrumentality and bluffing.  
Contrary to our predictions, we did not find a main 
effect for pressure to perform on bluffing behavior like we 
did with instrumentality. The lack of significance was 
surprising as one would expect that the greater the pressure 
felt, the more inclined individuals would be to strive for 
higher performance by possibly engaging in questionable 
behaviors. It appears, however, that other factors may 
mitigate this relationship, including perhaps the perceived 
risk of the behavior. It may be that as participants felt 
pressure to do well, they simultaneously feared that bluffing 
might result in retribution from other players which would 
hurt their chances to do well in the game. This reasoning 
could negate the tendency for high-pressured individuals to 
engage in bluffing. Most notable, however, is the finding 
that pressure exerted an influence on bluffing behavior, but 
that influence was moderated by ethical formalism. This 
pattern of results further magnifies the importance of ethical 
orientation, as formalism may blunt the otherwise powerful 
force pressure can have on individual behavior.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As a whole, the results of this study offer important 
contributions to both research and practice. Ethical 
dilemmas often involve misconduct and deception of one 
form or another. Interpretations of these acts may not be 
black or white, but rather fall in a gray area and depend on a 
number of contingencies. In fact, philosophical debate over 
the ethicality of bluffing engenders little agreement. While 
this debate is important, the literature is devoid of research 
examining the role individual differences with regards to 
the ethicality of bluffing in business. Our research moves 
the discussion forward by asking first, whether ethical 
orientation helps predict different views on the practice of 
bluffing and second, how those views influence individuals’ 
willingness to bluff and subsequent bluffing behavior in a 
competitive context. The majority of our results suggest 
that the answer is yes to both questions. Indeed, it is 
reasonable to expect that individuals interpret, apply, and 
balance ethical norms in different ways in light of their own 
values and life experiences. Insights gleaned from the 
person-situation debate also indicate that behavior results 
from both environmental and individual causes.  
The two-part study reported here therefore begins to 
fill an important gap in the literature by providing one 
explanation for questionable behavior. Consistent with 
previous research, our results indicated that formalism and 
utilitarianism are two independent dimensions of 
individuals’ ethical orientation (Brady and Wheeler, 1996; 
Schminke and Wells, 1999). Correspondingly, both have 
the ability to exert important influences on ethical 
judgments and behaviors; however, they do so through 
divergent avenues and in concert with different constructs. 
Our findings indicate that individual differences, 
specifically ethical predispositions, influence how people 
perceive bluffing when targeted at select organizational 
stakeholders. Results further indicate that formalist and 
utilitarian orientations interact with contextual factors to 
help explain individuals’ bluffing attitudes, intentions, and 
behavior. A complete understanding of the ethical 
implications of bluffing therefore requires that research 
consider individual difference variables in addition to 
features of the environment both within and beyond the 
organization.  
Practically speaking, it would behoove managers 
charged with overseeing company ethics and compliance 
activities to consider the individuals involved as well as the 
programs themselves. Awareness of potential differences 
may help practitioners implement, communicate, and train 
ethics programs in ways that generate optimal response. 
Managers can then use knowledge of individual differences 
to tailor their communications regarding the company’s 
ethical values and expectations with individual employees. 
For example, in our study, high utilitarians were concerned 
with instrumentality and outcomes. This suggests that 
managers may enhance utilitarians’ acceptance of ethics 
training to the extent the program focuses on outcomes and 
consequences as opposed to moral rules. In contrast, our 
findings suggest that such communication may do little to 
enhance acceptance among high formalists. Ethics training 
among formalists may be more effective to the extent that 
emphasis is placed on moral principles vis-à-vis outcomes 
and consequences. Clearly, elements of both outcomes and 
morality may be present in many ethics-related 
communications and training programs, yet the emphasis 
they receive in communications with employees may vary 
as a function of their ethical orientation. 
Consideration of the organization’s ethical values and 
industry standards may also be an essential starting point to 
improving our understanding of not only bluffing in 
business but also what type of individual will best fit in the 
organization. At some level, deceptive signaling reaches a 
level of gravity where it may be considered unethical in any 
organization. Frequently, however, the degree of ethicality 
may be indeterminate and somewhat industry dependent. In 
such cases, organizations must clearly identify and define 
their values and tolerance levels. If some degree of bluffing 
is an accepted industry norm and is encouraged by the 
organization, then high utilitarians may be a more 
appropriate fit than high formalists who may be 
uncomfortable engaging in such practices. This fit, 
interestingly, will also entail an element of risk for the 
organization as high utilitarians not only reported a greater 
willingness to engage in competitive bluffing but also 
indicated a greater willingness to mislead their own 
company.  
As with all research, this study has its limitations. Most 
notably, we measured perceptions of ethicality, pressure, 
and instrumentality as well as bluffing behavior within the 
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same post-game survey thereby raising the issue of 
common method variance. We believe this concern is 
mitigated some by the fact that ethical orientation was 
measured on a separate pre-game survey. Our factor 
analyses similarly alleviate some of this concern as results 
indicated that participants distinguished between the 
constructs. Nonetheless, future research should attempt to 
assess these variables with different instruments.  
Relatedly, our study is limited by the use of self-reports 
to measure both the individuals’ ethical views on and stated 
willingness to mislead important organizational 
stakeholders in the first part of the study. This 
methodological approach, however, corresponds to that 
used in prior research interested in the relationship between 
attitudes, intentions, and behavior (e.g., Ajzen and Madden, 
1986; Flannery and May, 2000; Beck and Azjen, 1991). 
Moreover, the objective of the hypothesis in which this data 
applied was not to differentiate between individuals’ 
attitudes and intentions per se, but rather (as demonstrated 
in the first part of the study) to examine whether their 
attitudes and intentions differed as a function of the target 
of the bluff and how this was related to individuals’ ethical 
orientation.  
Our sample size might also be viewed as a limitation. 
Thus, while the size was acceptable for the number of 
predictor variables considered, our results would likely 
have benefited from the statistical power that accompanies 
larger samples (Cohen and Cohen, 1975).  It is plausible 
that with a larger sample size all or more relationships 
would have been statistically significant. 
Finally, the cross-sectional nature of our data collection 
does not permit us to thoroughly explore some of the causal 
links suggested by the hypotheses. Using a longitudinal 
format, future research might for instance, be able to 
examine how signalers’ reputation impacts bluffing action 
and response in a competitive context. 
This study suggests several potential avenues for future 
research efforts. First, we examined only the role of 
individuals’ ethical orientation. Additional individual 
difference variables, such as stage of moral development or 
Machiavellianism, may influence beliefs about bluffing as 
well as willingness and actual bluffing behavior. Future 
research should examine these possibilities. Second, future 
research is needed to explore the effects of other contextual 
variables on the observed relationships. Above, we 
suggested that the perceived risks of bluffing might 
partially account for the lack of a significant main effect for 
pressure to perform on bluffing behavior. Although we did 
not measure perceived risk, future research could explore 
this possibility.  
Finally, future research that considers the relationships 
between corporate ethics policies and programs and ethical 
orientation should prove insightful. It may well be that the 
effectiveness of different policies and programs might be 
moderated by ethical orientation. Similarly, the approach 
organizations take to ethics might well serve as a moderator 
of the relationship between individuals’ ethical orientation 
and their resultant ethical behavior.  
We are optimistic that these ideas as well as the 
implications of our findings will spark interest in others to 
take research on the issue of bluffing in business in new and 
unique directions. Research along these lines will expand 
our understanding of bluffing behavior including the effects 
of individual differences on bluffing in business. 
Ultimately, we are hopeful that this stream of research will 
enhance our understanding not only of bluffing behavior, 
but also of the relationship between individuals’ ethical 
orientation and their attitudes and behaviors when dealing 
with an ever increasing assortment of ethical gray areas 
brought on by today’s changing business environment.   
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